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Taking Out the Trash - Where Will We
Put All This Garbage?
Daniel M. Weisberg
I. Introduction
America is a throw away society. Over the years we have
utilized many disposable items, such as lighters, diapers, and
cameras.' The out of sight, out of mind mentality has finally
caught up with society. While the garbage is carted away, and
therefore disposed to the naked eye, most of this garbage ends
up in a local landfill.2 Recent figures estimate that Americans
generated approximately 180 million tons of non-hazardous
solid waste in 1989.' Eighty percent of all trash works its way
to a landfill as its final resting place, of which many are al-
ready filled to capacity.4 Unfortunately, years of poor plan-
1. See Jonathan P. Meyers, Confronting the Garbage Crisis: Increased Federal
Involvement As a Means of Addressing Municipal Solid Waste Disposal, 79 GEO.
L.J. 567 (1991).
2. The correct terminology is "sanitary landfill," and is described as "a system of
trash and garbage disposal in which the waste is buried between layers of earth
.... WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 672 (1983).
3. See UNITED STATES EPA, CHARACTERIZATION OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE IN
THE UNITED STATES: 1990 UPDATE ES-3 (1990).
4. See Meyers, supra note 1, at 570.
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ning and lack of foresight have caught up with the American
throw away lifestyle. There has been a tremendous decrease in
the amount of active landfill space available, mainly due to
the serious environmental and health hazards posed by ex-
isting landfills, many of which closed because they could not
meet increasingly stringent regulations.' With fewer landfills
operational, many communities are faced with limited choices.
Particularly in the eastern states, there were few options. As
the number of available landfills decreased, the search for
practical solutions has increased. More and more, communi-
ties have turned to waste reduction and recycling,' but these
options are long range alternatives that Will not serve to alle-
viate the landfill crisis today. Unfortunately, most plans for
alleviating the solid waste crunch take time, a luxury many
communities cannot afford.7 Attempts to create more landfill
space are often met with disdain by local residents, and there
are fewer parcels of land available for consideration when sit-
ing a new landfill.' To some communities, the only viable al-
5. New Jersey landfills decreased from over 400 active sites before 1970 to 12 by
1989. See id. at 571. In New York, active landfills decreased from 600 in 1980 to 188
in 1989. Predictions are that New York could run out of landfill space as early as
1995. See Joseph Forti, Solving the Solid Waste Crisis in New York State, 61 N.Y.
ST. B.J. 30, 31 (July 1989). Nationwide, an estimated 14,000 landfills closed between
1978 and 1988. See Bradford C. Mank, Out-of-State Trash: Solid Waste and the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 38 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 25, 41 (1990) (citing
Kevaks and Anderson, States as Market Participants in Solid Waste Disposal Ser-
vices - Fair Competition or Destruction of the Private Sector, 18 ENVTL. L. 779-82
(1988)).
6. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has formulated an integrated
waste management strategy, which combines a variety of waste management practices
to safely handle the municipal waste stream, with minimal adverse impact on human
health and the environment. This strategy includes source reduction, which mini-
mizes the volume and level of toxics in products at the manufacturing level; recycling
of materials, including composting of yard wastes; waste combustion (incineration)
with energy recovery capabilities; and land disposal. See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE,
UNITED STATES EPA, THE SOLID WASTE DILEMMA: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION (1989); see
also SITES FOR OUR SOLID WASTE, infra note 8.
7. Alternatives to landfill disposal include waste reduction, recycling, or burning
garbage. See Meyers, supra note 1, at 570.
8. The acronym NIMBY (not in my backyard) has been coined to describe the
feelings of most residents when a landfill is to be sited in their community. The not in
my backyard syndrome is, however, only one of many considerations that interplay
when attempting to site a new landfill. Other factors include economic, health and
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss2/12
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ternative is to ship out the trash. Many municipalities must
ship their trash to other localities while they formulate plans
for long range solutions. Sending garbage to other counties
within a state, to another state, or to international destina-
tions is not always a welcome decision for the receiving local-
ity. In one highly publicized debacle, a barge loaded with
3,186 tons of waste from New York City became a symbol of
the magnitude of the waste disposal problem, as it searched
for a new home.' After 6,000 miles and five months at sea, the
barge eventually unloaded its cargo back in New York, having
been rejected by at least six states and three countries.1 0 A
similar journey by a barge carrying 14,000 tons of incinerator
ash from Philadelphia points to an ever increasing wariness
when it comes to accepting others' trash.1"
This paper will examine the shipment of solid waste be-
tween communities as an answer to the landfill crisis, and the
competing trends associated with the free flow of garbage
across state or county borders. It will also examine the at-
tempts to block the flow of waste at the interstate or intra-
state level, as well as looking at those communities that wel-
come the trash, or even mandate that it stay at home. Section
II looks at the constitutional barriers which prevent the barri-
cading of trash at state lines through the Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution. Section III examines some al-
ternative approaches enabling governments to maneuver
around the Commerce Clause prohibitions. Section IV evalu-
ates the federal approach to solid waste via the Resource Con-
safety, and environmental concerns. See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, UNITED STATES
EPA, SITES FOR OUR SOLID WASTE: A GUIDEBOOK FOR EFFECTIVE PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT
(1990).
9. Robert D. McFadden, Garbage Barge Returns in Search of a Dump, N.Y.
TIMES, May 18, 1987, at Al.
10. Id. The barge was rejected by North Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisi-
ana, Texas and Florida, as well as Mexico, Belize and the Bahamas. Id. The actual
journey at sea was eight weeks, however, the remainder of the five month period was
spent anchored in a local harbor while legal battles were fought over the fate of the
garbage. See Garbage Barge's Odyssey Over - 155 Day Dump-Site Hunt Ends at
Brooklyn Incinerator, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 25, 1987, at 5.
11. See Julienne I. Adler, United States' Waste Export Control Program: Bury-
ing Our Neighbors in Garbage, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 885, 885 (1991).
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servation and Recovery Act. Section V looks at those commu-
nities that welcome trash, and the reasons behind the
acceptance of trash others do not want. Section VI concludes
with some thoughts about the continuing solid waste crisis,
and the importation problem.
II. The Constitutional Barriers to Waste Transportation
Any attempt to interfere with the free flow of waste be-
tween states raises a constitutional question, since the move-
ment of trash has been held to be an item of trade and, as
such, within the protection of the Commerce Clause. 12
A. The Interstate Blockade
As states became increasingly aware of the growing
shortage of landfill space, they attempted to hoard the re-
maining space by blockading importation of waste that
originated outside state borders. Challenges to these state
laws were quickly upheld by the courts, especially when the
regulations were economic, protectionist measures."3 Perhaps
the most well known of the cases in this area, and the starting
point for constitutional analysis, is City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey,14 wherein the State of New Jersey attempted to
stop importation of trash into New Jersey landfills. The Su-
preme Court in City of Philadelphia held that enacting such a
discriminatory ban against out-of-state solid waste, while
placing no similar restrictions on trash generated within the
12. The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution provides "[tihe
Congress shall have the power . . . to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States. ... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. It has been held to be
restrictive of otherwise permissible state regulation, even in the absence of a conflict-
ing federal statute, if the regulation interferes with interstate commerce. Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). These negative restrictions by implication are
referred to as the dormant Commerce Clause. See generally Mank, supra note 5, at
28.
The Supreme Court has defined "waste" as a product within the meaning of in-
terstate commerce, and decreed that "[aill objects of interstate trade merit Com-
merce Clause protection . City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622
(1978).
13. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
14. 437 U.S. 617.
[Vol. 10
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state, violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution. 5 While there are no direct prohibitions
contained in the Commerce Clause itself, the provisions im-
plied in the dormant Commerce Clause forbid states from
substantially interfering with the free flow of interstate com-
merce."6 The Court said that a state could not discriminate
against waste merely based on its point of origin, if such dis-
crimination burdens interstate commerce.' There was no rea-
son why the out-of-state waste should be treated differently
from the waste generated within the state.'8 New Jersey ar-
gued that the statute had a legitimate local purpose - to pro-
tect the public health and safety - and that any effect on
interstate commerce was incidental; therefore, the statute
should be upheld unless the burden imposed on commerce
was clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene-
fits.'" This rationale was rejected by the Court which found
that motive was irrelevant when the purported regulation is
facially discriminatory.20 The Court stated that absence of
protectionist purpose does not establish the validity of the
regulation because "the evil of protectionism can reside in leg-
islative means as well as legislative ends."'"
The degree of impact the holding in City of Philadelphia
actually has is questionable since the Court only addressed
private landfills.22 The Supreme Court expressly left open the
question whether a state could discriminate vis-h-vis imported
trash when the government owns or operates a landfill.23 Since
eighty-one percent of all landfills are government owned or
operated, 4 it would seem that City of Philadelphia has a
loophole big enough to drive a garbage truck through.
15. Id. at 629.
16. Id. at 623; see also supra note 12.
17. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27.
18. Id. at 629.
19. Id. at 624; see also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
20. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627.
21. Id. at 626.
22. Id. at 627.
23. Id. at 627 n.6.
24. See Mank, supra note 5, at 41.
1993]
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1. The Market Participant Doctrine
In addressing whether a state which owns or operates a
landfill may discriminate against imported waste, the courts
have applied the market participant doctrine.2 5 Where a state
is itself participating in the market, and is not regulating the
industry, but is acting as another consumer competing in the
free market, it may lawfully discriminate on behalf of its
citizens.2 6
This doctrine was originally recognized and applied in
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.27 In Alexandria Scrap, the
State of Maryland effectively discriminated against out-of-
state scrap haulers to the benefit of local haulers, by requiring
stricter title documentation from those out of state who
wished to buy junk cars in Maryland and collect on state of-
fered bounties paid to haulers of junk cars which were previ-
ously titled in Maryland.28 The Supreme Court found that
"[n]othing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause
prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from
participating in the market and exercising the right to favor
its own citizens over others."" The Supreme Court revisited
25. See, e.g., Swin Resource Sys. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990); Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp.
1204 (D.R.I. 1987); Evergreen Waste Sys. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 643 F. Supp.
127 (D. Or. 1986), afl'd, 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987); Shayne Bros., Inc. v. District of
Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1984); County Comm'rs v. Stevens, 473 A.2d 12
(Md. 1984).
26. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980).
27. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
28. Id. at 796-802. Maryland had a policy of paying a bounty to scrap haulers
who removed abandoned vehicles that had previously been titled in Maryland. In
1974, the state legislature passed an amendment requiring certain documentation
when processing hulks (abandoned cars over eight years old), which constituted the
great majority of abandoned, and therefore, processed vehicles. See MD. ANN. CODE,
art. 661/2, § 11-1002.2(f)(5) (repealed 1977). The in-state processors were required to
produce a single document in which the person delivering the hulk to the processor
certified his right to the hulk and agreed to indemnify the processor from third-party
claims arising from the destruction of the vehicle. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 801.
The out-of-state processor was required to submit documentation relating to valid
title for the hulk, a much tougher standard of proof, which was a prerequisite for
collecting a bounty from Maryland. Id. at 801-02.
29. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 810.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss2/12
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the market participant doctrine in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,30
wherein South Dakota discriminated against out-of-state pur-
chasers of cement from state plants. By restricting the sale of
the cement to state residents, the state was merely acting as a
market participant, and thus was not violating the provisions
of the dormant Commerce Clause.-1 The Court found "no in-
dication of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of the
states themselves to operate freely in the free market." 2 The
market participant doctrine has also been held to allow states
to discriminate against waste from out-of-state, even where
the only landfill in the destination state is state owned or
operated.3
However, the market participant doctrine does have its
limitations. These limits were defined in South-Central Tim-
ber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 4 where the State of
Alaska passed legislation requiring timber purchased within
the state to be processed in the state before shipment out of
state.3  The Supreme Court declined to extend the market
participant doctrine because it found Alaska to be a market
participant in the timber sales market, not the timber
30. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
31. Id. at 440. South Dakota had supplied both residents and non-residents with
cement from its state run plant for over 50 years until its supply could not keep up
with the demand for cement. As a result, the South Dakota State Cement Commis-
sion instituted a policy of supplying only state residents with cement from the plant,
with any excess volume available to non-residents on a first come, first served basis.
Id. at 432-33. Reeves, Inc., a non-resident of South Dakota, had been purchasing 95%
of its cement from the plant, and was forced to cut its production by 76% after the
Commission's policy took effect. Id. at 433.
32. Id. at 437; see also White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Workers, 460
U.S. 204 (1983) (upholding [under the market participant doctrine] constitutionality
of executive order issued by Mayor of Boston requiring construction projects funded
by the city to contain at least 50% Boston residents).
33. See Lefrancois, 669 F. Supp. at 1212. While Rhode Island ran the only land-
fill which accepted all types of non-hazardous solid waste (through the services of a
state formed corporation - the Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corporation
(RISWMC)), nothing in the enacted legislation prevented any party from purchasing
land in Rhode Island and constructing a landfill. Id. at 1211.
34. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
35. Id. at 84. The Alaska Department of Natural Resources had proposed to sell
approximately 49 million board-feet of timber and gave notice pursuant to an Alas-
kan statute that successful bidders for the timber would have to partially process the
timber within the state. Id.; see ALASKA ADMIN. CODE § 76.130 (1974) (repealed 1982).
1993]
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processing market. 6 "The limit of the market participant doc-
trine must be that it allows a State to impose burdens on
commerce within the market in which it is a participant, but
[does not] allow[ ] it to ... impose conditions ... that have
a substantial regulatory effect outside of that particular
market. '37
In the context of solid waste, the market participant doc-
trine has been applied by five courts, each holding that a state
or local landfill may discriminate against out-of-state waste
without violating the dormant Commerce Clause.38 The most
recent application was by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
in Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County.3 9 In
Swin, the county operated landfill charged higher tipping fees
and placed weight restrictions on trash generated out-of-
state. 0 Lycoming County argued that it was a market partici-
pant, and thus could lawfully avoid the Commerce Clause re-
strictions.41 The court analogized Lycoming County's activi-
ties to other situations where the market participant doctrine
was applied, such as restrictions on the sale of state-produced
cement,"2 restrictions on hiring only local residents,' 3 and re-
strictions on which junk cars were entitled to state bounties."
The Third Circuit found that the activity here was of a simi-
lar nature, and thus the activity constituted market participa-
36. South-Central Timber, 467 U.S. at 98.
37. Id. at 97.
38. See Swin Resource Sys. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990); Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204
(D.R.I. 1987); Evergreen Waste Sys. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 643 F. Supp. 127 (D.
Or. 1986), aff'd, 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987); Shayne Bros., Inc. v. District of Co-
lumbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1984); County Comm'rs v. Stevens, 473 A.2d 12
(Md. 1984).
39. 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989).
40. Id. at 247-48. Tipping fees are generally an amount paid for each ton of trash
deposited at a landfill, and are paid to the landfill operator and then forwarded to the
state. Government Suppliers Consol. Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 734 F. Supp. 853, 856 (S.D.
Ind. 1990).
41. Id. at 246.
42. Id. at 250 (referring to Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980)).
43. Id. (referring to White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Workers, 460 U.S.
204 (1983).
44. Id. (referring to Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
[Vol. 10
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tion.4 5 The court distinguished South-Central Timber by not-
ing that the activity regulated here was strictly applicable to
the county landfill, and was therefore restricted to the market
within, which the county was participating."6 The court found
that Lycoming County "ha[d] not crossed the line that Alaska
crossed when that state attempted to regulate the timber
processing market by conditioning its timber sales on guaran-
tees that the purchasers would act in a certain way in a down-
stream market. 4 7 Thus, a state which acts as a market par-
ticipant, even though its actions are discriminatory, is not
bound by the dormant Commerce Clause.
2. Exceptions to the Market Participant Doctrine
Two important exceptions have been carved out of the
market participant doctrine. The first occurs when a state is
dealing with a natural resource.48 A state is not allowed to
hoard natural resources within its borders for the exclusive
benefit of its citizens.49 Therefore, a threshold determination
must be reached whether the landfill and its activities consti-
tute a natural resource. Those who oppose the application of
the market participant doctrine claim that the land on which
the landfills rest are scarce natural resources and therefore the
doctrine is inapplicable.5 0 Most courts have rejected this rea-
soning, principally based on the expenditures necessary to
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (holding that the market
participant doctrine might not be applied in. circumstances involving natural re-
sources). In Reeves, the item in commerce was cement, and the court held that this
was not a natural resource. Examples of natural resources given by the Reeves court
were coal, timber, wild game or minerals. Id. at 443-44. Cement was a product of
manufacturing; however, some of the components of cement may constitute a natural
resource, such as limestone. Id.
49. Id.; see also Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (striking
down West Virginia statute giving preference to domestic consumers of natural gas
over out-of-state users); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911)
(prohibiting Oklahoma from barring out-of-state transportation of natural gas).
50. See Meyers, supra note 1; see also Swin Resource Sys., 883 F.2d at 259 (Gib-
bons, J., dissenting).
1993]
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create the landfill, such as funds and labor.5 1 As the court
noted in Swin, the landfill did not exist "simply [by] happen-
stance" and was therefore not a natural resource.52
The second exception occurs when the state is not only
participating in the market, but is actually regulating the very
market in which it seeks to compete.53 Arguments have been
made that when a state or local government has the power to
establish where landfills will be and sets permit requirements
for landfill operations, it is not merely participating in the
market but is actually regulating the industry. 4 The Supreme
Court has held that where a state acts as a market regulator,
the market participant doctrine does not apply.5 5 Such a de-
termination was reached in South-Central Timber,56 when
Alaska attempted to force timber purchased within the state
to also be processed in the state before being shipped out of
state.57 Such downstream regulation has been expressly pro-
hibited,5' and a close examination must be made to determine
if a state is merely a participant or whether it is also regulat-
ing the market. As a threshold matter, a distinction must be
made as to the precise market in which the state is participat-
ing. Only by defining the market of participation can a deter-
mination be made whether the state is participating in that
market, or regulating that market or another downstream
market.59 In Swin, the court determined that Lycoming
51. See, e.g., Swin Resource Sys., 883 F.2d at 252 (landfill, unlike natural re-
sources, did not occur by happenstance; rather, funds were needed to construct
same); Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204, 1211 (D.R.I. 1987) (landfill
services are not a natural resource market); Evergreen Waste Sys. v. Metropolitan
Serv. Dist., 643 F. Supp. 127, 132 (D. Or. 1986), afJ'd, 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987)
(landfill is more than raw resource, it is highly regulated, costly waste disposal facil-
ity); County Comm'rs v. Stevens, 473 A.2d 12, 20 (Md. 1984) (landfill is result of
complex process of costly physical plant and human labor acting on raw materials,
not a natural resource).
52. Swin Resource Sys., 883 F.2d at 252.
53. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806-08 (1976).
54. See Meyers, supra note 1, at 579.
55. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 806-08.
56. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
57. Id. at 88.
58. Id. at 99.
59. See Swin Resource Sys., 883 F.2d at 249.
[Vol. 10
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol10/iss2/12
WASTE TRANSPORTATION
County had acted as a market participant in the landfill ser-
vice market, rather than as a market regulator.60 Similarly,
other courts faced with this issue have generally found land-
fills to be part of a landfill service market, and have measured
the participation or regulation by the state relative to that
specific market. 1
3. Non-Market Participant Analysis
Where a state is not acting as a market participant, a dif-
ferent analysis must be applied to the proposed legislative
blockade. If the statute at hand is discriminatory on its face,
and is merely a "protectionist" measure, it will be subject to a
"virtual[ ] per se rule of invalidity. '62 This rule stems from
the very notions that spawned the Constitution as originally
prescribed by the framers." In forming a union of states, it
was necessary "to avoid the tendencies toward economic Bal-
kanization that had plagued . . . the [c]olonies .. .. *"I' No
balancing of interests occurs to determine if the effect on in-
terstate commerce is minimal. Only if the state can proffer a
compelling reason for the distinction between waste based on
its origin will the discrimination be allowed. 5 Mere recitation
by the state that a compelling interest exists will not suffice. 6
Several courts have handed down decisions which indicates
that a compelling interest standard is difficult to meet.6 '
60. Id. at 254.
61. See, e.g., Lefrancois, 669 F. Supp. at 1211 (holding that state was participat-
ing in the landfill service market, not the landfill site market); Evergreen Waste Sys.,
643 F. Supp. at 131 (holding that district was participating in landfill service, and was
selling service to haulers); Shayne Bros., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 592 F. Supp.
1128, 1134 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding district, by expending funds, provided public ser-
vice by operating landfill, and was not a participant in the waste market); Stevens,
473 A.2d at 19 (holding that market was landfill services, not the handling of waste).
62. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
63. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979).
64. Id.
65. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 141 (1986) (preventing importation of
parasites into the state was a compelling reason, where the in-state supply of baitfish
was virtually parasite free).
66. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. at 336; Stephen D. DeVito, Jr. Trucking, Inc.
v. Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corp., 770 F. Supp. 775, 783 (D.R.I. 1991).
67. See Taylor, 477 U.S. 131; cf. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. 617; Pike v.
1993]
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In Maine v. Taylor,6 8 the Court found that a statute
which discriminated on its face was valid because there was a
compelling state interest at stake. 9 The Maine regulation
criminalized the importation of live baitfish into the state.7"
The Supreme Court distinguished this regulation from those
in City of Philadelphia, which were found to be an example of
simple economic protectionism.7 1 Here, the Court found a
compelling interest in protecting the wild fish population from
importation of infectious parasites that were prevalent outside
Maine, but were not common within the state.7 The Court
held that not all protectionist regulations are invalid, despite
their discriminatory nature. In Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel.
Douglas,3 the Supreme Court held that there was a legitimate
difference between economic protectionism and health and
safety regulations. In analyzing a state statute restricting
out-of-state use of groundwater, the Court looked past the
statute and considered the entire regulatory framework within
which the law was to operate to determine whether it was con-
stitutional.7 ' The key aspect to the Court's holding was the
imposition by the state of severe restrictions on groundwater
withdrawal by its own citizens. 76 The Supreme Court noted
that "a state that imposes severe . . . restrictions on its own
citizens is not discriminating against interstate commerce"
when it seeks to place similar controls on shipment out of
state. In addition to proving that a compelling reason for the
statute exists, a state must also demonstrate that the same
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
68. 477 U.S. 131.
69. Id. at 137.
70. Id. at 132; see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7613 (West 1981).
71. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 148; City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627.
72. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 141.
73. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
74. Id. at 956.
75. Id. at 958.
76. Id. at 955-56. The Court examined the overall regulatory framework and
found that, although the particular statute may have impermissibly discriminated
against interstate commerce, the finding that other Nebraska regulations placed se-
vere restrictions on the citizens within the state was taken into consideration in de-
termining the overall discriminatory effect of the challenged regulation. Id.
77. Id.
[Vol. 10
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purpose or goal could not be achieved through an available
non-discriminatory alternative.78 The Court in Taylor also
found that there were no non-discriminatory alternatives
available that would accomplish the state's purpose.7 9 The
Court held that a state could regulate to protect the health
and safety of its citizens, as long as it does not place itself in
"a position of economic isolation.""0
However, if a statute treats interstate and intrastate
waste even-handedly, it may be valid even though it has a dis-
criminatory effect as long as the effects on interstate com-
merce are only incidental.8 1 After determining that the statute
regulates even-handedly, an inquiry is then made to deter-
mine if there is a legitimate local purpose, and to what degree
the statute interferes with interstate commerce.8 2 Several fac-
tors must be taken into consideration, including the potential
harm to health and safety of the environment or human life,
and the availability or lack of viable alternatives to accom-
plish the purposes envisioned by the act."'
B. The Intrastate Dilemma
While the battle rages over whether a state can constitu-
tionally block the flow of garbage at its borders, local commu-
nities have also taken a stance against outside garbage, not
from another state, but from other counties within their state.
Several cases have discussed the issue of intrastate block-
ades of waste shipment, and not surprisingly, the courts have
split on whether this is permissible. In a 1985 decision, a Flor-
ida county was allowed to ban waste from other counties
within the state.8 " This decision was based on two factors.
78. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 140.
79. Id. at 151.
80. Id. (citing Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935).
81. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
82. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
83. See, e.g., Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, 939 F.2d 941, 945 (11th
Cir. 1991) (applying Pike test in determining that viable alternatives were available,
thereby rendering statute at hand unconstitutional).
84. Waste Aid Sys., Inc. v. Citrus County, Fla., 613 F. Supp. 102 (M.D. Fla.
1985).
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First, the court took notice that although waste was banned
from the county-owned landfill, other landfills within the
county were available for noi-resident use.8 5 Second, the
court felt that the ban was rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose - to protect the health, safety and
welfare of state residents.8 6 However, the decision was based
on equal protection grounds, and since no suspect classifica-
tion was involved, the statute only needed to pass the rational
basis test.87 This, of course, is not the test applied under Com-
merce Clause analysis, as laid down by the Supreme Court.88
In another intrastate case, Diamond Waste, Inc. v.
Monroe County,89 the Eleventh Circuit struck down a county
resolution similarly seeking to ban all waste from entering the
county into a regional landfill.90 While the court found the
resolution regulated even-handedly and accomplished a legiti-
mate local purpose, it was "loathe to characterize the possible
effects . . . on interstate commerce as 'incidental.' "91 The
court indicated, however, that had the county demonstrated
"a more pressing need for preserving landfill space," the regu-
lation may very well have been upheld.2
Most recently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
the Sixth Circuit to hear the appeal of Bill Kettlewell Exca-
vating v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources.9 3 In
Kettlewell, the Sixth Circuit held that a county within the
State of Michigan could refuse to accept waste generated by
another county within the state.94 The court reasoned that the
statute applied even-handedly in its treatment of in-state and
85. Id. at 106-07.
86. Id. at 104-07.
87. Id. at 105.
88. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617
(1978); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
89. 939 F.2d 941 (11th Cir. 1991).
90. Id. at 942.
91. Id. at 944.
92. Id. at 946.
93. 931 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michi-
gan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992); see infra notes 98-105.
94. Bill Kettlewell Excavating, 931 F.2d at 417.
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out-of-state waste, and went on to find that there was a legiti-
mate local purpose, and only an incidental burden on inter-
state commerce."5 The statute was upheld because it author-
ized banning importation of waste from anywhere outside the
county, including waste from within the state, for legitimate
local purposes. In this instance, the purpose was to maintain
compliance with a comprehensive local plan for waste dispo-
sal, which had been authorized by the Michigan legislature.96
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Cir-
cuit.9 7 In Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Depart-
ment of Natural Resources,9 s the Supreme Court once again
returned to the very beginning of Commerce Clause analysis,
relying on City of Philadelphia9 in finding the intrastate ban
was violative of the Commerce Clause, in that it placed an
impermissible burden on the free flow of interstate com-
merce. 100 It is important to recognize that the decision in Fort
Gratiot only applies to restrictions involving private landfills,
and has no bearing on the market participant doctrine. 101 The
Court noted that Michigan had not identified any reason, le-
gitimate or otherwise, to justify treating waste originating
outside the county differently from waste originating
95. Id.
96. Id. at 417-18. See also Solid Waste Management Act of 1978, 1978 Mich.
Pub. Acts 641 (codified as amended at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 299.413a,
299.430(2) (West 1984 & Supp. 1992). The statute involved was part of Michigan's
Solid Waste Management Act (SWMA), which was amended in 1988 by adding two
waste import restriction sections:
"A person shall not accept for disposal solid waste ... that is not generated in
the county in which the disposal area is located unless the acceptance of solid waste
* . . that is not generated in the county is explicitly authorized in the approved
county solid waste management plan." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 299.413a (West 1984
& Supp. 1992).
"In order for a disposal area to serve the disposal needs of another county, state,
or country, the service. . . must be explicitly authorized in the approved solid waste
management plan of the receiving county." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 299.430(2)
(West 1984 & Supp. 1992).
97. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112
S. Ct. 2019 (1992).
98. Id.
99. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
100. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, 112 S. Ct. at 2027.
101. Id. at 2023.
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within.10 2 The Court also rejected the notion that the statute
regulates even-handedly, since it purports to treat waste from
within Michigan (but outside the affected county) no differ-
ently than out-of-state waste." 3 In addition, the statute was
claimed to further legitimate local interests, with a minimal
burden on interstate commerce, and that burden "was not
clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits."104 This ra-
tionale, which seeks to legitimize discrimination against out-
of-state interests by similarly burdening interests within the
state, has been clearly rejected by the Court.105 Finally, the
Court also rejected Michigan's claim that the Supreme Court
authorized discrimination, such as that found here, by its
opinion in Sporhase,06 wherein the Court differentiated be-
tween economic protectionist measures, and legitimate health
and safety regulations.10 7 The Court stated that while the rest
of the Michigan SWMA might be examined as legitimate
"health and safety regulations with no protectionist purpose,"
the waste import restrictions at issue here were not of the
same character, and were clearly discriminatory on their
face.108 As such, these regulations could only be valid if the
state could prove there were legitimate health and safety con-
cerns that could not be adequately addressed through the use
of non-discriminatory alternatives;109 a burden the state failed
to meet.'10
These cases illustrate that economic discrimination, at
least where private solid waste facilities are concerned, will
not be tolerated. Nothing in the Supreme Court's decisions
indicate any similar restrictions where the state is acting as a
market participant. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has in-
dicated several ways in which states can block the flow of out-
102. Id. at 2024.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2025-26.
106. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
107. Id. at 956.
108. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, 112 S. Ct. at 2027.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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of-state trash without violating the Commerce Clause.
III. Alternative Methods Around the Constitutional
Prohibitions
Despite the rather onerous burden of proof required to
justify regulations which bar the flow of trash in interstate
commerce, states have instituted creative alternatives to ac-
complish the same goals. The majority of states have enacted
solid waste plans, through which they establish legitimate
health and environmental goals, and the policies necessary to
carry out these goals.11' Through the authority granted by
state legislatures, states or local communities have been
granted the authority to treat waste from outside localities
differently, so long as they do not violate the Commerce
Clause restrictions. 112 In formulating local or regional plans to
deal with the solid waste problem, various methods have been
employed in an attempt to block the importation of solid
waste. Some localities have raised the fees charged at landfills
for accepting waste, or have set a scale which charges different
rates depending on the origin of the trash, with out-of-state
waste carrying a higher fee than in-state waste." 3 However, it
is not clear whether such a fee system is constitutional, since
111. While most states already have drafted solid waste plans, or are in the pro-
cess of doing so, new RCRA provisions will mandate that all states have such plans.
These plans provide a road map for state initiatives in handling their solid wastes.
See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF ENVTL. REGULATION, SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT IN FLORIDA,
1990 ANNUAL REPORT (1991); DIVISION OF SOLID WASTE, N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL.
CONSERV., SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT PLAN, 1990-91 UPDATE (1991); WASHINGTON
STATE DEP'T OF ECOLOGY, WASHINGTON STATE SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT PLAN
(1991).
112. While various states' legislation may give states authority to block the flow
of waste, the various court challenges throughout this paper indicate that such legis-
lation may not be constitutional, despite legitimate state intentions.
113. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-30B-2 (1990 & Supp. 1992) CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §
41,903 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.57 (Anderson 1992).
The Alabama code allowed imposition of an additional $72 per ton fee on hazardous
waste from out of state. This fee was upheld by the Alabama Supreme Court, but was
struck down by the United States Supreme Court as unconstitutional. See Guy Hunt
v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 584 So. 2d 1367 (1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2009
(1992).
1993]
17
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
it invariably has some effect on interstate commerce."' This
type of fee system was recently challenged when Ohio insti-
tuted a three-tiered fee scale, with out-of-state waste paying a
higher fee than in-state waste." 5 In National Solid Wastes
Management Ass'n v. Voinovich,"16 the district court ruled
the statute at hand unconstitutional, in that the statute dis-
criminated against interstate commerce and the state did not
have a compelling reason for such discrimination."' On ap-
peal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, and remanded the case to the
lower court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether
the state did indeed have a compelling reason for discriminat-
ing against the out-of-state waste."' Ohio had argued that the
likelihood of hazardous waste (which would be harmful to its
citizens) entering the state required greater efforts in the ar-
eas of inspection, clean-up and enforcement, all of which justi-
fied the higher fees."" The court found this justification (if
found to exist after a hearing) to be similar to that in Maine
v. Taylor,20 and concluded that the district court must assess
whether Ohio had such a compelling reason for the statute,
and whether less discriminatory means were available to ac-
complish the statute's goals."'
On the same day that the decision in Fort Gratiot"I was
announced, the Supreme Court, in Chemical Waste Manage-
114. See supra notes 66-84 and accompanying text (discussing when a state may
permissibly burden interstate commerce).
115. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3734.57 (Anderson 1992). The statute authorizes a
tax of $0.70 per ton for waste generated within the district, $1.20 for waste outside
the district but within the state, and $1.70 for waste generated outside the state. Id. §
3734.57(A). The statute further imposes additional fees that range from 42% to 300%
higher for out-of-state waste. See National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Voi-
novich, 763 F. Supp. 244, 254 (S.D. Ohio 1991), rev'd, 959 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1992).
116. 763 F. Supp. 244 (S.D. Ohio 1991), rev'd, 959 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1992).
117. Id. at 262.
118. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Voinovich, 959 F.2d 590, 594
(6th Cir. 1992), reh'g en banc denied, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 11641 (6th Cir. May 14,
1992).
119. Id. at 593.
120. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
121. Voinovich, 959 F.2d at 593.
122. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112
S. Ct. 2019 (1992).
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ment, Inc. v. Hunt, 3 also struck down as unconstitutional an
Alabama statute authorizing higher fees for the disposal .of
hazardous waste generated outside the state but disposed of
within Alabama.12 The Alabama Supreme Court found the
statute to be valid, stating that it served legitimate local pur-
poses that could not be served by less discriminatory alterna-
tives.12 5 The United States Supreme Court rejected the lesser
scrutiny of the Pike16 test applied by the state court, 27 and
instead analyzed the statute using "the strictest scrutiny.' 2
While the Court found that there were legitimate local pur-
poses for the discriminatory fees, none of these purposes were
enough to overcome the Commerce Clause violation caused by
the discrimination. 29 There was simply "no evidence before
[the] Court that waste generated outside Alabama is more
dangerous than waste generated in Alabama."' 30 Furthermore,
the Court pointed out several less discriminatory alternatives
available to the state, such as per mile taxes, across the board
caps, or additional fees on all waste disposed of within the
state, regardless of origin.' 3 '
Other tactics used to prevent waste from being imported
into a state are more unique. The State of Maine, acquiescing
to the fact that out-of-state waste cannot be banned from
landfills (except those in which the state is a market partici-
pant), has chosen to prohibit new commercial solid waste fa-
cilities from operating in the state. 32 Since this type of mea-
sure apparently regulates even-handedly, it is not likely to be
123. 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992).
124. Id. at 2017. Alabama enacted Act No. 90-326, which authorized an addi-
tional fee on out-of-state hazardous waste of $72 per ton. See 1990 Ala. Acts 326, § 3;
ALA. CODE § 22-30B-2(b) (1990 & Supp. 1992).
125. Chemical Waste Management, 112 S. Ct. at 2012 (citing Chemical Waste
Management, 584 So. 2d at 1390).
126. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
127. Chemical Waste Management, 112 S. Ct. at 2014 n.5.
128. Id. at 2014.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2015.
131. Id.
132. OFFICE OF PLANNING, STATE OF MAINE, WASTE MANAGEMENT AND RECYCLING
PLAN 22 (July 1990).
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challenged. Another innovative measure involves reciprocal
agreements between states to limit the importation and/or ex-
portation of trash. Indiana has such an agreement with both
New York and New Jersey. 3s Under these agreements, waste
is not accepted from companies not properly licensed in the
home state.1 3 4 While not a per se ban on importation, Indiana
has successfully blocked trash shipments from over a dozen
New Jersey and four New York transfer stations," 5 thereby
decreasing the trash entering its landfills. Whether these
types of interstate agreements will withstand constitutional
challenges remains unanswered.
Furthermore, any state is free to limit the amount of
trash entering the landfills within the state by placing caps on
the amount of trash allowed in a landfill. 3 6 The only prereq-
uisite to this type of restriction is that it may not discriminate
against waste solely based on its origin.13 7 So long as the cap
applies equally to in-state or out-of-state waste, it will gener-
ally be upheld as constitutional. 38
In light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Fort Gratiot
and Chemical Waste, state legislative attempts to allow cir-
cumvention of the Commerce Clause prohibitions concerning
out-of-state trash seem likely to fail. Whether disguised as a
necessary tax for health and safety reasons, or claimed as an
even-handed regulation because it treats in-state and out-of-
state waste alike, the discriminatory nature, absent a compel-
ling reason, will not withstand the Commerce Clause's strict
133. Indiana Signs Waste Agreement With N.Y.; Starts Talks With Ontario,
Canada, INTEGRATED WASTE MANAGEMENT, Jan. 22, 1992, at 1 (hereinafter Waste
Agreement). Prior to entering into these agreements, Indiana had enacted legislation
allowing higher tipping fees to be charged on out-of-state waste and requiring certifi-
cation from waste haulers as to the origin of the waste. See IND. CODE §§ 13-9.5-5-1,
13-7-22-2.7(c)(1) (1990), respectively. These statutes, like most similar legislative at-
tempts to block waste shipments, were held unconstitutional. See Government Sup-
pliers Consol. Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 734 F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
134. Waste Agreement, supra note 133, at 1.
135. Id.
136. Chemical Waste Management, 112 S. Ct. at 2015.
137. Id. at 2016.
138. Id.; see also State Considers Combination of Higher Fees, Subsidies for In-
State Waste, Official Says [23 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at
1160 (Aug. 8, 1992).
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scrutiny standard.
IV. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
The statutory authority for waste management at the fed-
eral level is contained within the Solid Waste Disposal Act
(SWDA), 3 9 more commonly referred to by its amended ver-
sion, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA). 40 While RCRA authorizes federal oversight of solid
waste,"" the main thrust of the act has focused on the evils of
hazardous waste, 4" leaving the problems associated with non-
hazardous waste to the states to resolve."4 3 In actuality, Con-
gress specifically envisioned that solid waste would be handled
on a local basis, as stated in the congressional findings in sec-
tion 1002 of RCRA.14 4
RCRA was scheduled for reauthorization in 1992,'14 and
it appears that Congress has realized that the problems of
solid waste have not been adequately addressed under the
current version of the Act. RCRA, as amended by the pro-
posed legislation, would contain various provisions addressing
solid waste, including stricter requirements for controlling
pollution emanating from landfills.14 6 Perhaps the most signif-
139. Pub. L. No. 89-272, tit. II, 79 Stat. 992 (1965) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988)).
140. Pub. L. No. 94-580, § 2, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988)). All references hereinafter will refer to RCRA.
141. RCRA § 1002, 42 U.S.C. § 6901.
142. See Meyers, supra note 1, at 569; see also 137 CONG. REC. S5282 (daily ed.
Apr. 25, 1991) (statement of Sen. Chafee) (noting that the 1984 RCRA amendments
concentrated on hazardous wastes, while the primary focus of the current
reauthorization is on non-hazardous solid wastes).
143. Id.
144. RCRA § 1002(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) states "[tihe collection and dis-
posal of solid wastes should continue to be primarily the function of State, regional,
and local agencies."
145. See Outlook 1992: Solid, Hazardous Waste, [22 Current Developments]
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 2195 (Jan. 24, 1992) (hereinafter Outlook). RCRA was
last amended in 1984 at which time funding for the statute was authorized through
1988. Congress has since authorized funding on a yearly basis through appropriations
bills. See Congressional Wrap-Up, [23 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) No.
26, at 1653 (Oct. 23, 1992).
146. See infra note 167.
19931
21
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
icant provisions, however, are those that effect the interstate
import and/or export of waste. Provisions in the proposed
Senate and House versions of the bill will allow states to dis-
criminate against out-of-state waste, either by allowing in-
creased fees for waste imported into the state," 7 or by grant-
ing local governments the authority to approve waste
imports.1 48 These are the very economic, protectionist mea-
sures rejected by the Supreme Court as violative of the Com-
merce Clause.149 The desire to allow states to discriminate
against waste imports has caused quite a stir within both
houses of Congress. Some members of Congress are staunch
supporters of the right of a state to discriminate against waste
imports in order to protect the health and environment of a
particular state's citizens.15 0 Senator Dan Coats of Indiana has
been one of the main advocates in pushing legislation that
would allow states to decide what to do with trash at their
147. See S. 976, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 407 (1991) (authorizing states to impose
fees on out-of-state waste up to. five times the rate charged for in-state waste, effec-
tive upon enactment of the bill, and up to 10 times the amount after 36 months);
H.R. 3865, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 106 (1991) (authorizing fees starting six months
after enactment that can be four times the in-state rate rising to 10 times the amount
after 42 months). The House version also provides for placing limits on the amount of
imported trash should a state decide not to impose a higher fee. Id.
While neither bill allows an outright ban on waste importation, the fee system
could amount to a de facto ban. See House Subcommittee Draft of RCRA Legislation
Would Allow Higher Fees on Out-of-State Waste, [22 Current Developments] Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 1404 (Oct. 4, 1991).
148. See Subcommittee Adopts RCRA Amendment to Allow Localities to Ban
Out-of-State Waste Shipments, [22 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) No.
48, at 2628 (Mar. 27, 1992); New Draft of Senate RCRA Reauthorization Would Ex-
pand TRI, Promote Industry Recycling, [22 Current Developments] Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 49, at 2660 (Apr. 3, 1992) (discussing House and Senate amendments
prohibiting landfills from accepting out-of-state solid waste without permission of the
local government).
149. See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text. Congress, of course, has the
power to authorize states to regulate conduct that would otherwise be violative of the
Commerce Clause. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (citing Southern Pac.
Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945)). However, unless the con-
gressional intent is "unmistakably clear," the Supreme Court has refused to exempt
state statutes from Commerce Clause limitations. Id. at 139 (citing South-Central
Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984)).
150. See 138 CONG. REc. S9917 (daily ed. July 20, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Coats); 137 CONG. REC. S5283, 5285 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1991) (statements of Sens.
Chafee and Burdick).
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borders. 151 However, in the face of strong opposition from in-
dustry and environmental groups and legislators from states
which must ship trash to avoid imminent crisis situations,
neither the House nor the Senate bills to reauthorize RCRA
reached the floor in the respective part of Congress. 152 The
Senate, realizing that a RCRA reauthorization could not be
accomplished before the end of the 102d Congress, substituted
an interstate waste transportation bill, hoping to at least solve
151. Senator Coats first proposed allowing states to restrict the flow of waste
imports in September, 1990, as part of a District of Columbia appropriations bill. See
H.R. 5311, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 111 (1990); see also Legislation Allowing States to
Ban Interstate Waste Transport Passes Senate, [21 Current Developments] Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 1045 (Sept. 21, 1990) (hereinafter Waste Transport). Senator
Coats was also a sponsor of S. 2877, which was the interstate waste bill substituted
for the proposed RCRA amendments in the Senate. S. 2877, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992).
152. The sponsor of the RCRA bill in the House, Rep. Al Swift, attacked indus-
try and environmental sources for slowing the reauthorization process. The House
attempted to separate the interstate waste provisions from the full RCRA bill, but
this action was fought by critics who felt that the pared down version might be called
a RCRA reauthorization later on, leaving many important reauthorization issues po-
tentially unsolved. See Impasse on House RCRA Bill Continues; House Panel Chair-
man Lashes Out at Industry, [23 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 23,
at 1506 (Oct. 2, 1992).
As early as 1990, Indiana legislators had introduced bills to allow states to block
the flow of imported waste. Senator Dan Coats and Reps. John Myers and Phil Sharp
sought to protect states, such as Indiana (which had an estimated eight years of land-
fill space available) from the continual influx of out-of-state waste. See Waste Trans-
port, supra note 152, at 1045; see also Judith B. Austin, Sharp, Other Hoosiers Unite
to Keep Garbage Out of State, Gannett News Serv., Apr. 25, 1991 available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, GNS File.
As strongly as these legislators pushed for the passage of their bills, the same
could be said of the resiliency of the opposition. Congressmen from states such as
New Jersey, which had critical shortages of landfill space which necessitated out-of-
state shipment of waste, vehemently opposed legislation allowing the blockage of
waste shipments in interstate commerce. See Senators See "Civil War" Over Waste
Imports; Coats Says He Will Offer Import Ban Bill Again, [22 Current Develop-
ments] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 485 (June 21, 1991).
Other groups resisting import bans are the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) and the National Solid Wastes Management Association (NSWMA). See
Congress Should Not Allow States to Ban Interstate Transport of Waste, Industry
Says, [22 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 107 (May 10, 1991).
Allen Moore, president of NSWMA, has stated that bans on interstate transport of
waste could lead to materials being dumped in substandard landfills, or to illegal
dumping. Id.
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the waste transportation dilemma.153 While this bill over-
whelmingly passed in the Senate,154 it met with a cold shoul-
der in the conference committee, and was not enacted before
Congress ended its session."' While members of Congress de-
bate whether states should be allowed to restrict the inter-
state flow of waste, other political groups have also wrestled
with the proposition to restrict waste imports. 156 Politicians
are not alone in their crusade against amending RCRA to al-
low states to discriminate against interstate shipment of
waste. The Bush administration also publicly opposed the leg-
islative efforts. 57 Comments by both then EPA Administra-
tor, William K. Reilly, and the former top waste official at
EPA, Don Clay, 58 clearly stated that the suggested provisions
153. See S. 2877, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); see also Baucus, Coats Offer Inter-
state Waste Bill; Prospects for RCRA Rewrite Fade, Staff Says, [23 Current Devel-
opments] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 700-01 (July 26, 1992).
154. The Interstate Transportation of Municipal Waste Act of 1992 passed in
the Senate by a vote of 89 to 2 on September 23, 1992. See 138 CONG. REC. S10,168
(daily ed. July 23, 1992).
155. See 138 CONG. REC. H12,605 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1992). The early days of the
103d Congress saw the introduction of two solid waste bills in the House, H.R. 105,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) and H.R. 599, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), both of which
were sent to the House Energy and Commerce Committee. See Bill on Solid Waste
Transport Introduced, [23 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 2656
(Feb. 5, 1993); First Two Days of 103d Congress See Introduction of 16 Environmen-
tal Bills, [23 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 38 at 2352 (Jan. 15,
1993).
156. The National Governors' Association advisory panel has come out against
state bans and fees on waste imports. See Governors' Panel Reject Management Pol-
icy; Controversy Continues Over Interstate Shipping, [22 Current Developments]
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 2332 (Feb. 7, 1992). But see Ban on Out-of-State Waste
Shipments Proposed to Legislature by Governor, [22 Current Developments] Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 2132 (Jan. 10, 1992) (Pennsylvania Governor Robert Casey
proposed solid waste, legislation banning all out-of-state waste from being shipped
into Pennsylvania). Furthermore, support for interstate waste legislation has come
from the U.S. Conference of Mayors. See House Committee Approves Compromise
RCRA Bill With Support From Most Democrats, Republicans, [23 Current Develop-
ments] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 756-57 (July 10, 1992).
157. See Outlook, supra note 145, at 2195-96.
158. Mr. Clay was the Assistant Administrator for EPA's Office of Solid Waste
and Emergency Response, and both Mr. Reilly and Mr. Clay were replaced under the
new administration of President Clinton. The new head of EPA, Carol Browner, has
not yet indicated a position on the transportation of waste issue.
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amending Subtitle D'8 9 are technically infeasible and ineffi-
cient at solving the national solid waste problem. 160 These
provisions could also lead to greater environmental harm.
Regulations already in place under Subtitle D, which take ef-
fect in October, 1993,161 will force many smaller landfills to
close when they are unable to conform to new federal regula-
tions, thereby frustrating the purpose behind the regulations
- to insure that waste ends up in environmentally sound
landfills."6 2 Allowing states to discriminate against importa-
tion of waste would prevent the utilization of safer, larger
landfills, forcing states to place waste in potentially unsafe lo-
cal landfills. 6 3
RCRA's proposed amendments contain many provisions
which require more stringent controls on landfills.16 4 Some of
these controls will have a devastating effect on local landfills.
One solid waste engineer stated that the less flexible RCRA
requirements could lead to the imminent closing of New York
City's only landfill years before state regulations would have
required closure.16 5 Should this take place, one can only imag-
159. RCRA §§ 4001-4010, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949(a). Subtitle D is the common
industry term for these RCRA sections dealing with non-hazardous solid waste.
160. See Outlook, supra note 145, at 2195-96; see also Market Approaches, Ex-
isting RCRA Authority Preferable to Reauthorization, EPA Official Says, [22 Cur-
rent Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 2515 (Mar. 13, 1992) (hereinafter
Market Approaches). EPA has estimated that new RCRA legislation could carry
costs up to $46 billion annually, while reducing risks only nominally. See Senate
RCRA Legislation Could Cost Up to $46 Billion Per Year, EPA Estimates, [23 Cur-
rent Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 888. (July 17, 1992) (quoting letter
from Don Clay, Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste, EPA, to Sen. Max Baucus).
161. EPA issued new Subtitle D regulations on Oct. 9, 1991, which include loca-
tion standards for landfill siting, liner and leachate system upgrades, groundwater
monitoring, increased post-closure care, and enhanced financial responsibility re-
quirements. See Kenneth M. Kastner, 1991 Highlights for the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, [22 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 2161 (Jan. 17,
1992). For the complete rule as promulgated, see 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 258.
162. See Market Approaches, supra note 160, at 2515.
163. Id.
164. Minimum requirements for all landfills, both new and existing, would in-
clude double liner systems, leachate collection and removal systems, construction
quality assurance plans, and siting prohibitions. See S. 976, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. §
404 (1991).
165. Interview with Richard Bruzzone, Solid Waste Engineer, New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation, Region 2, in New York, N.Y. (Mar. 16,
1993]
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ine the horrors that would accompany the landfill's closing as
New York searches for alternative disposal sites.166
V. We Welcome Your Trash
While the battle to stop the flow of trash has become of
prime importance, it does not present the full picture of the
solid waste importation issue. Some communities actually wel-
come waste, and some even seek to penalize those that seek to
send waste out of the area. Gilliam County, Oregon, is one
such community that welcomes trash.167 It is a desolate, eco-
nomically depressed area that has welcomed trash not only
from areas within the state, such as Portland, but also from
neighboring states and their large cities, like Seattle, Wash-
ington.16 8 The potential economic benefits that will accrue to
this area from accepting the trash far outweigh the negative
aspects most communities dread.169 Regional landfills can po-
tentially handle great amounts of trash in an economical man-
ner due to economies of scale and are an attractive, environ-
mentally sound approach to handling the solid waste
crunch.' 70
1992). Region 2 is responsible for permitting and enforcement, within New York City,
Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) regulations (6 N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. Pt. 360 (1991)), and the provisions of the Environmental Conservation
Law (N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 27-0101 to 1517 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1991)).
166. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. Estimates by New York State
DEC indicate that enactment of proposed RCRA legislation could force New York to
expend an additional $283.5 million per year to ship waste to other locations. Memo-
randum from David R. O'Toole, Chief, Bureau of Municipal Waste Permitting to Al-
bert H. Muench, Chief, Bureau of Program Resource Management (Mar. 26, 1992)
(on file with the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation).
167. See Robert T. Nelson, Dealing With Waste - Oregon, Here We Come -
First Seattle Shipment of Garbage Set for Next Month, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 24,
1991, at B1.
168. Id.
169. Id. It is estimated that the Columbia Ridge landfill in Gilliam County will
provide over 100 permanent jobs, contribute $30 million in property taxes to the com-
munity (leading to property tax rebates for residents), as well as provide free trash
collection for the county. Id.
170. See REGION 10 SOLID WASTE AND STATE PROGRAMS SECTION, UNITED STATES
EPA, ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF REGIONAL MSW DISPOSAL 2 (1990).
"Mega-landfills" are expected to increase in number as smaller landfills are forced to
close due to stricter requirements which limit potential sites for new landfills. See
[Vol. 10
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While communities like Gilliam County welcome waste, a
problem arises when a community or state enacts legislation
requiring all trash generated within the municipality or state
to be disposed of within its borders. This, in effect, is the re-
verse of the problem of state blockades of imported trash -
here the blockade is on exportation. The analysis applied,
however, is the same as in importation problems. The ques-
tion that arises is one of interference with the free flow of
commerce. In Stephen D. DeVito, Jr. Trucking, Inc. v. The
Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corp., the State of
Rhode Island created a public corporation to oversee the regu-
lation of collection, transportation and disposal of solid waste
within the state.7 2 A resolution was adopted directing that all
solid waste originating within the state had to be disposed of
at a facility licensed by the state-created corporation.173 Since
the state corporation had no power to license out-of-state fa-
cilities, the resolution effectively mandated that all waste gen-
erated within the state must not be transported outside
Rhode Island.1 74 The district court followed the same Com-
merce Clause analysis applied to restrictions on imports of
solid waste and refused to uphold. the legislative pronounce-
ment that there was a legitimate purpose behind the stat-
ute.17 5 After finding that the statute discriminated on its face,
in that it did not apply even-handedly to interstate and intra-
state interests, the court continued its analysis to determine if
there was a legitimate (compelling) local purpose being ad-
vanced and whether that interest could be served by reasona-
Cost of Compliance With RCRA Subtitle D Will Lead to "Mega-Landfills," Consult-
ant Says, [23 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 1204 (Aug. 14,
1992). The Eagle Mountain landfill, located in the California Desert 60 miles East of
Palm Springs, is expected to operate for 100 years, with the capacity to handle 20,000
tons of non-hazardous waste per day. See Kaiser Steel EIR for Eagle Mountain
Landfill to be Circulated in Summer, INTEGRATED WASTE MANAGEMENT, July 10,
1991, at 1.
171. 770 F. Supp. 775 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 947 F.2d 1004 (1st Cir. 1991).
172. Stephen D. DeVito, Jr. Trucking, 770 F. Supp. at 777.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 778.
175. Id. at 779-81.
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ble, non-discriminatory alternatives. 17 Having found no such
legitimate local purpose, the statute was struck down as un-
constitutional. 17 "It does not matter that the [s]tate has shut
the article of commerce inside the [s]tate in one case and
outside the [s]tate in the other.' 7  The same result was
handed down in Waste Systems Corp. v. County of Martin,79
which had facts strikingly similar to those of DeVito. 80 The
district court found the ordinances at issue, which mandated
that all waste generated within the county be sent to a county
built waste composting facility, were clearly economic protec-
tionist measures.' 81 As such, they violated the Commerce
Clause, and while there may have been a legitimate local pur-
pose, there were certainly less discriminatory alternatives
available. 82
Nevertheless, some communities have successfully en-
acted legislation keeping waste within governmental bor-
ders. '8 In J. Filiberto Sanitation, Inc. v. New Jersey Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection,8 4 the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld a local regulation promulgated pursuant to
New Jersey's Solid Waste Management Act which-mandated
that all waste collected in Hunterdon County (New Jersey) be
deposited at a transfer station within the county. 185 The court
found no discriminatory burden on interstate commerce and
applied the Pike8 ' test, balancing the incidental burden on
interstate commerce with the local benefits to be derived from
176. Id. at 783.
177. Id. at 785.
178. Id. at 780 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 628).
179. 784 F. Supp. 641 (D. Minn. 1992).
180. Waste Sys., 784 F. Supp. at 644.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 645.
183. See, e.g., J. Filiberto Sanitation, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protec-
tion, 857 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1988).
184. 857 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1988).
185. Id. at 923; see N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 7:26-6.5(k)(3) (1992) (All solid
waste types [including municipal solid waste] .. .generated from within Hunterdon
County municipalities shall be transported to the Hunterdon County transfer station
186. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
[Vol. 10
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the statute.1 87 In so doing, the court stated that although bur-
dening in-state and out-of-state interests alike does not neces-
sarily validate the statute, 88 in this particular case the party
challenging the statute had failed to show that the statute was
protectionist in nature. 89 The court looked at the burden on
the haulers of the trash, not the trash itself, and found the
burdens were equal on both in-state and out-of-state
residents. 90
The clearly diverse interpretations by the courts that
have examined the issue vis-a-vis the mandate that trash stay
within the county makes it quite likely that this is yet another
aspect of trash regulation that the Supreme Court needs to
tackle.
VI. Conclusion
The solid waste crisis is firmly entrenched, and solutions
are not close at hand. As communities grapple with waste dis-
posal, temporary solutions must be worked out. The problem
must be categorized as either national in scope, in which case
state barriers to waste shipment must fail, or as local
problems which each state, region or local community must
resolve on their own. Yet virtually every state transports some
portion of its waste stream out-of-state, and few states have
adequate facilities to handle all waste disposal within the
state.191 New regulations are forcing many older landfills to
close, resulting in higher fees at the remaining landfills. As a
consequence, it is becoming financially expedient to ship some
trash out of state. Closing these avenues will mean a higher
rate of illegal dumping, along with waste being deposited in
inadequately constructed landfills. Clearly, the Supreme
Court has felt that waste shipment is part of interstate com-
187. J. Filiberto Sanitation, 857 F.2d at 922.
188. Id. at 919 (citing Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432
U.S. 333, 350-52 (1977)).
189. Id. at 922.
190. Id. at 921.
191. See House Subcommittee to Solicit Comments on Outline of RCRA
Reauthorization Bill, [22 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 782
(July 26, 1991).
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merce and has struck down most state attempts to block
waste shipment, especially when the measures are merely eco-
nomic, protectionist measures. However, Congress, in the pro-
posed reauthorization of RCRA, as well as in separate inter-
state waste legislation, has decided to focus on solid waste,
realizing that the states alone are not adequately addressing
this issue. In so doing, sponsors of various bills in Congress
are seeking to allow states to discriminate against out-of-state
waste, thereby actually leaving to each state how best to deal
with its landfill resources and its trash. Any solution to the
waste shipment problem will be temporary at best, and
America must strive to find alternatives to the landfill crisis.
Land is a resource of defined quantity; once it runs out,
America must have other waste disposal resources and tech-
nology available. If not, we may all be buried under our own
garbage.
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